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Criminal Justice Update - June 2021
Abstract
The Criminal Justice Update is a monthly newsletter created by the Adams County Bar Foundation Fellow
providing updates in criminal justice policy coming from Pennsylvania's courts and legislature as well as
the US Supreme Court.
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◦ PA Superior Court: Criminal Law & Procedure
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Keep up to date with
developments in criminal law,
criminal procedure, and victims

Updates from PA Governor’s Office
*No new updates this month

issues via this monthly
newsletter.
Comments or questions?
Contact Patrick Mahoney at
mahopa01@gettysburg.edu.

Updates from the PA Legislature
Criminal Law & Procedure
House Bill 1429 -– Preventing and Investigating Cases of ElderCare Abuse
Final Passage in the House, June 15, 2021

https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2021&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=1429

House Bill 1429 would amend Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
“to give the Attorney General’s office concurrent jurisdiction to investigate individuals who use their
position of trust to financially exploit older adults and care-dependent people”
House Bill 975 --- Protecting Elderly Victims of Sexual Assault and Abuse
Final Passage in the House, June 16, 2021
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2021&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=975

House Bill 975 would amend Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
“to extend the protections of the institutional sexual assault statute to cover elders and other caredependent persons who are assaulted by those who have the responsibility of providing care.”
Under House Bill 975, “this new offense would be triggered when a caretaker engages in sexual
intercourse or indecent contact with a care-dependent person who receives care in or from a facility. A

person convicted under this new subsection of institutional sexual assault would commit a 3rd degree
felony, punishable by up to 7 years imprisonment and/or a fine up to $15,000.”
House Bill 87 --- Protecting Victims of Child Abuse and Pornography
Final Passage in the House, June 24, 2021
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2021&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=87

House Bill 87 would amend Titles 18 (Crimes and Offenses), 23 (Domestic Relations), and 42 (Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes “to increase penalties for those
convicted of child pornography where those images or videos depict a victim that is younger than 10
years of age or prepubescent, permit the Pennsylvania Commission of Sentencing to provide a sentence
enhancement for those convicted of the sexual abuse of children where the person depicted is known as
the defendant, and establish a two-year, 23-member Task Force on child pornography.”
House Bill 954 --- Investigating Cases and Protecting Victims of Child Abuse
Final Passage in the Senate, June 25, 2021
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2021&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=954

House Bill 954 would amend Titles 18 (Crimes and Offenses) and 23 (Domestic Relations) “by further
providing for criminal history record information in central repository or automated systems and further
providing services for prevention, investigation and treatment of child abuse.”
Senate Bill 411 –- Amending the Consolidation of the Department of Corrections and Parole Board
Final Passage in the House, June 25, 2021
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2021&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=411

House Bill 411 would amend Titles 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure), 61 (Prisons and Parole), and 71
(State Government) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes to authorize the Department of
Corrections “to create parole violator centers to expand its ability to work with parolees during the
reentry process. State parole agents would be required to receive training in social work, criminology,
psychology, psychiatry, and criminal justice”
Senate Bill 246 --- Protecting Victims of Human Trafficking
Final Passage in the Senate, June 25, 2021
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2021&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=246

Senate Bill 246 would amend Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
“to prohibit defendants from introducing evidence of a human trafficking victim’s past sexual
victimization and allegations of past sexual victimization in any prosecution arising under Chapter 30
(relating to human trafficking).”

Senate Bill 708 --- Strengthening Victims’ Access to Services and Compensation
Final Passage in the Senate, June 25, 2021
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2021&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=708

Senate Bill 708 would amend the Crime Victims Act of 1998 to “help streamline the victim compensation
process, make certain more victims receive the help they need and know their right to be enrolled into
the Address Confidentiality Program.”
The Act would strengthen victims’ access to services and compensation “by extending the time limit to
file for compensation, eliminating the 72-hour time limit for reporting crimes to authorities, allowing
alternative forms of reporting to qualify for compensation, and ensuring that a victim’s conduct, such as
marijuana possession, does not immediately bar him or her from qualifying for compensation”

Updates from the Courts
U.S. Supreme Court
Criminal Law & Procedure
Terry v. United States
DECIDED: June 14, 2021
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-5904_i4dk.pdfv

“Petitioner Tarahrick Terry contends that he is eligible to receive a sentence reduction for his 2008 crack
cocaine conviction. In 1986, Congress established mandatory-minimum penalties for certain drug
offenses. That legislation defined three relevant penalties for possession with intent to distribute
cocaine. The first two carried mandatory minimum sentences based on drug quantity: a 5-year
mandatory minimum (triggered by either 5 grams of crack cocaine or 500 grams of powder cocaine) and
a 10-year mandatory minimum (triggered by either 50 grams of crack or 5 kilograms of powder). 100
Stat. 3207–2, 3207–3. The third penalty differed from the first two: it did not carry a mandatory
minimum sentence, did not treat crack and powder cocaine offenses differently, and did not depend on
drug quantity. Id., at 3207–4. Petitioner was subjected to this third penalty when he pleaded guilty in
2008 to possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of crack. The District Court
determined that his offense involved about 4 grams of crack. Two years later, Congress passed the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, which increased the crack quantity thresholds from 5 grams to 28 for the 5- year
mandatory minimum and from 50 grams to 280 for the 10-year mandatory minimum. §2(a), 124 Stat.
2372. But Congress did not make this change retroactive until 2018, when it enacted the First Step Act.
After that, Petitioner sought resentencing on the ground that he was convicted of a crack offense

modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. The District Court denied his motion, and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.
Held: A crack offender is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act only if convicted of a
crack offense that triggered a mandatory minimum sentence. The First Step Act makes an offender
eligible for a sentence reduction only if the offender previously received “a sentence for a covered
offense.” §404(b), 132 Stat. 5222. The Act defines “ ‘covered offense’ ” as “a violation of a Federal
criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by” certain provisions in the Fair
Sentencing Act. §404(a), ibid. The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for offenses that
triggered mandatory minimum penalties because a person charged with the same conduct today no
longer would face the same statutory penalties that they would have faced before 2010. For example, a
person charged with knowing or intentional possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of
crack was subject to a 10-year mandatory minimum before 2010. Now, he would be subject only to a 5year mandatory minimum. But the Fair Sentencing Act did not modify the statutory penalties for
petitioner’s offense. Before 2010, a person charged with petitioner’s offense—knowing or intentional
possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of a schedule I or II drug—was subject to
statutory penalties of imprisonment of 0-to-20 years and up to a $1 million fine, or both, and a period of
supervised release. After 2010, a person charged with this conduct is subject to the exact same statutory
penalties. Petitioner thus is not eligible for a sentence reduction. Pp. 5– 8.”
Lange v. California
DECIDED: June 23, 2021
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-18_new_6k47.pdf

“This case arises from a police officer’s warrantless entry into petitioner Arthur Lange’s garage. Lange
drove by a California highway patrol officer while playing loud music and honking his horn. The officer
began to follow Lange and soon after turned on his overhead lights to signal that Lange should pull over.
Rather than stopping, Lange drove a short distance to his driveway and entered his attached garage. The
officer followed Lange into the garage. He questioned Lange and, after observing signs of intoxication,
put him through field sobriety tests. A later blood test showed that Lange’s blood-alcohol content was
three times the legal limit. The State charged Lange with the misdemeanor of driving under the
influence. Lange moved to suppress the evidence obtained after the officer entered his garage, arguing
that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The Superior Court denied Lange’s motion,
and its appellate division affirmed. The California Court of Appeal also affirmed. It concluded that
Lange’s failure to pull over when the officer flashed his lights created probable cause to arrest Lange for
the misdemeanor of failing to comply with a police signal. And it stated that Lange could not defeat an
arrest begun in a public place by retreating into his home. The pursuit of a suspected misdemeanant,
the court held, is always permissible under the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement. The California Supreme Court denied review.
Held: Under the Fourth Amendment, pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not always—that is,
categorically—justify a warrantless entry into a home. Pp. 3–16. (a) The Court’s Fourth Amendment

precedents counsel in favor of a case-by-case assessment of exigency when deciding whether a
suspected misdemeanant’s flight justifies a warrantless home entry. The Fourth Amendment ordinarily
requires that a law enforcement officer obtain a judicial warrant before entering a home without
permission. Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373, 382. But an officer may make a warrantless entry when
“the exigencies of the situation,” considered in a case-specific way, create “a compelling need for official
action and no time to secure a warrant.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460; Missouri v. McNeely, 569
U. S. 141, 149. The Court has found that such exigencies may exist when an officer must act to prevent
imminent injury, the destruction of evidence, or a suspect’s escape. The amicus contends that a
suspect’s flight always supplies the exigency needed to justify a warrantless home entry and that the
Court endorsed such a categorical approach in United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38. The Court
disagrees. In upholding a warrantless entry made during a “hot pursuit” of a felony suspect, the Court
stated that Santana’s “act of retreating into her house” could “not defeat an arrest” that had “been set
in motion in a public place.” Id., at 42–43. Even assuming that Santana treated fleeing-felon cases
categorically, that statement still does not establish a flat rule permitting warrantless home entry
whenever a police officer pursues a fleeing misdemeanant. Santana did not resolve the issue of
misdemeanor pursuit; as the Court noted in a later case, “the law regarding warrantless entry in hot
pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant is not clearly established” one way or the other. Stanton v. Sims, 571
U. S. 3, 8, 10. Misdemeanors run the gamut of seriousness, and they may be minor. States tend to apply
the misdemeanor label to less violent and less dangerous crimes. The Court has held that when a minor
offense (and no flight) is involved, police officers do not usually face the kind of emergency that can
justify a warrantless home entry. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 742–743. Add a suspect’s flight
and the calculus changes—but not enough to justify a categorical rule. In many cases, flight creates a
need for police to act swiftly. But no evidence suggests that every case of misdemeanor flight creates
such a need. The Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents thus point toward assessing case by case the
exigencies arising from misdemeanants’ flight. When the totality of circumstances shows an
emergency—a need to act before it is possible to get a warrant—the police may act without waiting.
Those circumstances include the flight itself. But pursuit of a misdemeanant does not trigger a
categorical rule allowing a warrantless home entry. Pp. 3–12. (b) The common law in place at the
Constitution’s founding similarly does not support a categorical rule allowing warrantless home entry
whenever a misdemeanant flees. Like the Court’s modern precedents, the common law afforded the
home strong protection from government intrusion and it generally required a warrant before a
government official could enter the home. There was an oft-discussed exception: An officer, according
to the common-law treatises, could enter a house to pursue a felon. But in the misdemeanor context,
officers had more limited authority to intrude on a fleeing suspect’s home. The commentators generally
agreed that the authority turned on the circumstances; none suggested a rule authorizing warrantless
entry in every misdemeanor-pursuit case. In short, the common law did not have— and does not
support—a categorical rule allowing warrantless home entry when a suspected misdemeanant flees. Pp.
12–16. Vacated and remanded.

PA Supreme Court
Criminal Law & Procedure
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. KHALID M. HARTH
DECIDED: June 22, 2021
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-102-2020mo%20-%20104811371138377098.pdf?cb=1

“In this appeal by allowance, we consider whether a trial court may rely upon its own unavailability as
justification for denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial provisions of
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, without first requiring the Commonwealth to demonstrate that it acted with due
diligence in prosecuting the defendant’s case. For the reasons that follow, we find that a trial court may
invoke “judicial delay” in order to deny a defendant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss only after the
Commonwealth has demonstrated that it complied with the due diligence requirements of Rule 600 at
all relevant periods throughout the life of the case. Thus, we reverse the order of the Superior Court,
reverse Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and discharge him.”
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. WILLIAM HENRY COSBY, JR.
DECIDED: June 30, 2021
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-100-2020mo%20-%20104821740139246918.pdf?cb=1

“In 2005, Montgomery County District Attorney Bruce Castor learned that Andrea Constand had
reported that William Cosby had sexually assaulted her in 2004 at his Cheltenham residence. Along with
his top deputy prosecutor and experienced detectives, District Attorney Castor thoroughly investigated
Constand’s claim. In evaluating the likelihood of a successful prosecution of Cosby, the district attorney
foresaw difficulties with Constand’s credibility as a witness based, in part, upon her decision not to file a
complaint promptly. D.A. Castor further determined that a prosecution would be frustrated because
there was no corroborating forensic evidence and because testimony from other potential claimants
against Cosby likely was inadmissible under governing laws of evidence. The collective weight of these
considerations led D.A. Castor to conclude that, unless Cosby confessed, “there was insufficient credible
and admissible. evidence upon which any charge against Mr. Cosby related to the Constand incident
could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”1 Seeking “some measure of justice” for Constand, D.A.
Castor decided that the Commonwealth would decline to prosecute Cosby for the incident involving
Constand, thereby allowing Cosby to be forced to testify in a subsequent civil action, under penalty of
perjury, without the benefit of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 2 Unable to
invoke any right not to testify in the civil proceedings, Cosby relied upon the district attorney’s
declination and proceeded to provide four sworn depositions. During those depositions, Cosby made
several incriminating statements. D.A. Castor’s successors did not feel bound by his decision, and
decided to prosecute Cosby notwithstanding that prior undertaking. The fruits of Cosby’s reliance upon
D.A. Castor’s decisionCosby’s sworn inculpatory testimonywere then used by D.A. Castor’s

successors against Cosby at Cosby’s criminal trial. We granted allowance of appeal to determine
whether D.A. Castor’s decision not to prosecute Cosby in exchange for his testimony must be enforced
against the Commonwealth.”

PA Superior Court
(Reporting only cases with precedential value)

Criminal Law & Procedure
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. CHRISTOPHER KOGER
FILED: June 5, 2021
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A06036-21o%20-%20104795940137030609.pdf?cb=1

“Christopher Albert Koger (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the
Washington County Court of Common Pleas, following his second revocation of parole for his conviction
of possession of child pornography1 and his second revocation of probation for his conviction of criminal
use of a communication facility.2 Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence for his probation and
parole revocations, arguing the Commonwealth did not establish the specific conditions of his parole
and probation. This appeal returns to this panel after remand, on March 31, 2021, for supplemental
information. The trial court has provided this information. We hold that because the court did not
advise Appellant of the conditions of his probation and parole at the time of the initial sentencing, the
court could not have found he violated these conditions. Thus, we vacate the instant revocation of
probation and parole (VOP) judgment of sentence.”
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. TAYLOR JEFFERSON
FILED: June 7, 2021
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-E02001-20o%20-%20104797464137160073.pdf?cb=1

“Appellant, Taylor Jefferson, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 42-84 months’ incarceration,
imposed following his conviction of firearms not to be carried without a license.1 Herein, Appellant
challenges the trial court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress the seized firearm under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and, alternatively, under Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. He contends that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle
based solely on the inference that the registered owner of the vehicle, who had an outstanding warrant,
would be found in the vehicle. After careful review, we affirm.”

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLAVNIA v. JOSEPH AULISIO
FILED: June 8, 2021
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A07025-21o%20-%20104799332137304819.pdf?cb=1

“Appellant Joseph Gerard Aulisio appeals from the Judgment of Sentence imposed at a resentencing
hearing following the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Miller and Montgomery. 1 He challenges the
court’s imposition of two consecutive terms of incarceration of thirty years to life, arguing that the
aggregate minimum term of sixty years is a de facto life sentence. After careful review, and pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416 (Pa. Super. 2018), we affirm.”
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. BRY’DRICK DA’MICHAEL WRIGHT
FILED: June 9, 2021
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A07041-21o%20-%20104800899137429508.pdf?cb=1

“Appellant, Bry’Drick Da’Michael Wright, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 42 to 84 months’
incarceration entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County after a jury found him guilty of
Possession With Intent to Deliver (“PWID”), Possession of Marijuana—Small Amount Personal Use, and
Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.1 He challenges the denial of his motion to suppress a state
parole officer’s warrantless vehicle search, the sufficiency of evidence offered to prove his constructive
possession of contraband recovered from the vehicle, and the admission of incriminating text messages
retrieved from his cell phone. We affirm.”
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. CHARLES E. WILLIAMS
FILED: June 15, 2021
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S54032-20o%20-%20104806896137922914.pdf?cb=1

“Charles E. Williams (“Williams”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his
conviction of first-degree murder, criminal attempt, and possession of firearm prohibited.1 We affirm.”
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. AARON CHARLES MARTIN
FILED: June 23, 2021
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A06007-21o%20-%20104814184138588537.pdf?cb=1

“Appellant, Aaron Charles Martin, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 8-16 months’
imprisonment and 2 years’ consecutive probation, imposed after he was found guilty of carrying a
firearm without a license1 following a stipulated, non-jury trial. Appellant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress the seized firearm, arguing that the seizure was the poisonous
fruit of observations made by police after an unconstitutional entry into the hotel room where he was
found. Alternatively, Appellant maintains that, even if observed from a lawful vantage point, the police
did not possess reasonable suspicion to enter the room and search him for a firearm. After careful
review, we reverse Appellant’s conviction and vacate his judgment of sentence.”
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANDREW THOMAS ALEXANDER
Filed: June 29, 2021
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S17041-21o%20-%20104819877139092537.pdf?cb=1

“Andrew Thomas Alexander appeals the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas
of Lycoming County (trial court) following a non-jury trial in which he was found guilty of one count of
obscenity in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 5903(a)(3)(i) based on sexually explicit text messages he sent to an
unidentified recipient. Alexander now contends that the evidence of obscenity was legally insufficient,
and that his text messages are statutorily and constitutionally protected communications. Because his
texts do not fit the statutory definition of obscene material, we reverse the conviction and vacate the
judgment of sentence.”
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